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 South Africa’s growth revival after 1994 









This paper sets out to identify, describe and seek causes for South Africa’s growth revival since 
1994. Following an analysis of the initial conditions for an economic recovery in 1994, growth 
accounting is used to distinguish the relative contributions of capital, labour and total factor 
productivity  to  this  growth  revival  at  the  aggregate,  sectoral  and  sub-sectoral  (for 
manufacturing) levels. There is a substantial South African literature on the evolution of capital, 
labour and productivity which is combined here with the empirical evidence of the last decade 
to judge the potential contribution of these factors to the growth recovery. This paper finds 
that openness (to trade and capital flows) and a stable macroeconomic environment (partly 
attributable to policy) have been leading causes of South Africa’s growth recovery. 
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South  Africa’s  democratic  transition  in  1994  created  expectations  of  a  significant  turnaround  in  economic 
performance. Trade and financial sanctions and internal political opposition to the apartheid government had 
contributed to the poorest ten-year growth performance since the Second World War and the removal of these 
constraints was widely expected to transform the country’s economic performance (De Wet, 1995).  One could 
also argue that rising prosperity was needed to sustain the political transition.  In the event, the decade since 1994 
did see an improved growth performance in South Africa, particularly when compared to the previous ten years.  
However, the improvement was modest, on average, both by international standards and the standard of South 
Africa’s own history. 
                                                       
1 Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch. This paper was prepared for the conference “Economic policy under democracy: 
a ten year review” held in Stellenbosch on the 28th and 29th October 2005. We are grateful for the comments and suggestions by the 
conference participants, especially Janine Aron but also John Muellbauer and three referees. The responsibility for remaining errors rests 
with the authors.   
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This paper sets out to identify, describe and seek causes for South Africa’s economic recovery since 1994. It starts 
with a description of the economic recovery in section 2, though the main body of the paper starts with section 3 
where the initial conditions for an economic recovery are evaluated using local and comparable international data. 
Growth  accounting  is  then  used  to  distinguish  the  relative  contributions  of  capital,  labour  and  total  factor 
productivity to this growth revival at the aggregate, sectoral and sub-sectoral (for manufacturing) levels. In this 
regard the paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways: at the aggregate level the paper considers a 
wider range of measures for the contribution of labour than in existing studies using data of a recent vintage, 
while at sectoral level the paper contributes an analysis of developments since 1997.   
    
The paper proceeds in the fourth section with a consideration of potential causes for the relative contribution of 
capital, labour and productivity. The purpose is to identify those underlying causes that would explain the relative 
contributions by these factors of production and in that way build an explanation for the economic recovery in 
South Africa since 1994. There is a substantial South African literature offering analyses and explanations for the 
evolution of capital, labour and productivity and this literature is combined with the empirical evidence of the last 
decade to judge the potential contribution of these factors in the growth recovery. However, the literature is 
based on earlier samples of South African data (overlapping at best for a few years with the period since 1994) 
and many of the causes that evidently operated earlier do not help to explain more recent trends. Three factors 
which operated earlier, have also been important more recently as causes of South Africa’s growth recovery 
though, i.e. openness (to trade and capital flows), lower interest rates and reduced uncertainty associated with 
stable macroeconomic policies and a successful political transition.  
 
2.  TRENDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE 1994 
 
The performance of the South African economy fluctuated considerably in the post-War era, but particularly 
since the early 1980’s.  This is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the level of real per capita GDP from 1960 to 
2004.  Two trends stand out: firstly, the decline in real per capita GDP since 1981 and, secondly, the growth 
revival since 1995.  The focus of the paper is on the “revival” (i.e. 1995 – 2004), but the decade of “decline” (i.e. 
1985  –  1994)  is  also  discussed  briefly  in  this  section  to  provide  the  immediate  context  of  the  subsequent 
“revival”.   
 
South Africa’s real economic growth rate averaged 3.1 percent (1.1 percent in per capita terms) during the period 
1995 – 2004 (see figure 2).  This represented a substantial improvement on the 0.8 percent average growth rate (-
1.3 percent in per capita terms) registered in the decade from 1985 – 1994.  Although this was a welcome 
improvement, South Africa’s growth performance remained relatively low by world standards.2 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
South Africa’s improved growth performance also appears to be gathering pace:  the average growth rate for the 
first five years after 1994 was 2.6 percent followed by a 3.6 percent average in the second five years. However, it 
is difficult to identify this performance with a change in the long-run growth potential of the economy, as the 
recovery has also been co-extensive with the longest post-war upswing of the South African business cycle. In 
2005 the growth rate increased to 5.1 percent and forecasters are generally optimistic that the growth rate will 
remain above 4 percent (on average) for the next few years (for example, Laubscher, 2006).  
 
In order to consider the nature of this improvement in South Africa’s growth performance the behaviour of the 
various components of the overall GDP may be considered. The sectoral distribution of total production for the 
period 1984 to 2004 is presented in table 1 both as ratios to GDP and in terms of average growth rates for the 
two decades. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The table reveals some noteworthy characteristics of the pattern of South Africa’s growth over the past two 
decades. The most striking feature is the sustained rise of the tertiary sector relative to the rest of the economy, 
                                                       
2 In the decade since 1994 the regional per-capita GDP growth rates for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America were 1.1 
percent and 0.8 percent respectively, while South Asia (with 3.7 percent) and East Asia (with 6.2 percent) did considerably 
better (Rodrik, 2006: 2).  
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accounting for a more than proportionate share (78 percent of GDP) of growth since 1994, as it had done in the 
preceding decade  (94 percent of GDP growth between 1985 and 1994). The fastest growing individual sub-
sectors  since  1994  (both  in  the  tertiary  sector)  were  transport,  storage  and  communication  and  financial 
intermediation,  insurance,  real  estate  and  business  services.  Meanwhile,  manufacturing  contributed  less  than 
proportionately to growth in both decades, but especially in the decade before 1994 during which time its share 
of GDP declined from 23 percent in 1984 to 20.9 percent in 1994. Manufacturing grew at 2.7 percent in the 
decade after 1994 and provided 16.3 percent of the growth in real GDP since 1995, but still declined as a 
proportion of total output. The primary sector (at an average growth rate of 0.5 percent) provided the smallest 
contribution to the growth revival since 1994 (the mining and quarrying share of GDP declined from 12.7 
percent in 1984 to 7.0 percent in 2004 and agriculture, forestry and fishing from 4.8 percent to 3.1 percent). 
 
Table 2 provides basic data about investment in the South African economy over the last two decades, including 
the average growth rate of investment over these periods and the division of investment by type of organisation, 
by type of asset and by type of economic activity. Expenditure on fixed investment in South Africa improved 
sharply in the period 1995 – 2004 compared to the previous ten years.  Despite this improvement, however, fixed 
capital formation (as a percentage of GDP) was only 16.2 percent in 2004 (up from 15.2 percent in 1994) and 
remains low by international standards and also relative to what is required for sustained high real GDP and 
employment growth rates. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows two striking trends in the data: first, the sharp increase of private investment expenditure in total 
investment expenditure  in contrast with the declining share of government investment expenditure.  Second, 
investment in machinery and equipment is not only the largest category of investment by type of asset but also 
the most rapidly growing.3 
 
International  capital  flows  are  of  great  importance  for  the  South  African  economy  due  to  a  long-standing 
mismatch between domestic saving and domestic investment as is shown by the data in table 3, while table 4 
shows the data for foreign capital inflows associated with the imbalance between domestic saving and investment.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The data in table 3 reveals a number of interesting features of savings behaviour in South Africa.  Firstly, the bulk 
of domestic saving (other than the provision for depreciation allowances) is provided by the corporate sector.  
Secondly, household saving has declined from 3 percent of GDP in 1985 – 1994 to less than 1 percent in 1995 – 
2004.  Thirdly, the government continued to dissave at a rate of between 3 and 4 percent of GDP.  Fourthly, total 
gross domestic saving has declined from more than 20 percent in 1985 – 1994 to 15.5 percent in 1995 – 2004.  
Given the stable gross capital formation ratio this implies, fifthly, that foreign saving has swung around from a 
negative GDP ratio of 2.5 percent of GDP in 1985 – 1994 to a positive 2.4 percent in 1995 – 2004. 
 




3. UNTANGLING SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE 1994 
 
3.1  Initial conditions in the early 1990s 
 
That South Africa had, at one time, possessed not only the potential for catch-up growth, but had to an extent 
realised that potential is a matter of historical record: by 1900 the economy had developed sufficiently for it to be 
a likely member of the international “convergence club” in Dowrick and DeLong’s (2005) reckoning. Though the 
average per capita growth rate was unspectacular (on an international comparison) during the 1913-1929 period, 
economic growth accelerated to an impressive rate of 3.8 percent per capita (on average) between 1929 and 1950. 
During this period South Africa’s per capita growth was amongst the fastest in the developing world and much 
higher than the growth rates of the leading industrialised economies. However, on a per capita basis (and relative 
to the international sample used here) South Africa’s economic growth was unimpressive throughout the post-
                                                       
3 Classified by type of economic activity, the largest categories are fixed investment in the financial (24.5 percent in 2004) and 
the manufacturing (20.1 percent in 2004) sectors. The most rapidly growing sectors are construction and transport, storage 
and communication.   
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War era and the economy gradually left the “convergence club” in Dowrick and DeLong’s (2005) judgement.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
This long-run relative decline of South Africa’s economic performance is demonstrated graphically in figure 3, a 
box plot of the per capita GDP relative to USA per capita GDP for the countries in a comparative sample for the 
periods indicated using the data reported in Appendix A4.  
 
Three trends stand out in this graph. First, there are only two intervals on this graph during which South Africa 
gained both against the USA and relative to the peer group, i.e. a modest gain between 1970 and 1980 and a more 
substantial gain between 1913 and 1950. Second, South African per capita GDP stagnated relative to the USA 
since the fifties and declined since 1980. Third, the international peer group gained against the USA during the 
fifties and sixties, so that South Africa’s per capita GDP fell back within the international group even while it 
kept pace with the USA.  
 
In addition to the long-term pattern of economic growth, proxies for the development of human capital, the 
fertility rate, access to public services, income inequality, the export share in GDP and the share of manufactured 
goods within exports, provide further information about the initial conditions for economic recovery in South 
Africa by 1994. Figure 4 compares the initial conditions for South Africa along these dimensions with the median 
value for a peer group of developing countries in 1994.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
The  male  and  female  literacy  radii  show the  adult  literacy  rate  for  both  sexes  as  a  percentage  of  the  total 
population and the radii for primary and secondary school enrolment show the percentage of the school age 
population enrolled at these school levels. While only the male literacy rate amongst the education radii show 
South Africa in an unfavourable light against the group by 1994, the South African score on all these measures 
hide  very  considerable  between  (racial)  group  variation.  Also  the  South  African  male  literacy  rates  were 
substantially lower (at 82 percent) than those countries in the dataset closest to South Africa in terms of per 
capita income in 1994, Argentina (96 percent), Mexico (92 percent) and Venezuela (92 percent).  
 
The education legacy of apartheid was not only lower educational attainment for the black and coloured groups, 
but also a between group quality gap. For example, in the year 2000, 55.6 percent of all matriculants passed their 
higher grade mathematics exam, while only 15.3 percent of black pupils passed the same exam (Van der Berg, 
2005). Furthermore, the average pass rates hide the acute problem of poor quality education in South Africa. On 
the Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) comparative test 
of reading and mathematics for grade six learners, South African learners ranked on average 8th and 9th out of 14 
countries for reading and mathematics respectively (Van der Berg, 2005). The relatively poor performance on 
mathematics is especially disconcerting given the important synergies between mathematical ability in human 
capital and productivity (see 4.1 below). 
 
The relative fertility radius in figure 4 shows the total fertility rate for each country as a proportion of the fertility 
rate in Nigeria (the highest in the peer group at 5.6). At the time of its political transformation, South Africa still 
had a higher fertility rate than the median for the peer group (as well as notably larger than the sub-group of 
Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela), which added to the demographic pressure on the labour market, where labour 
market participation expanded dramatically (see 4.3 below), and on the poor rural regions. 
 
The inequalities of South African society at the time of the political transition are more clearly visible along the 
Gini coefficient radius in figure 4: South Africa and Brazil had the most unequal income distributions in this 
sample by the mid-nineties. However, severe inequality does not distinguish South Africa from the comparable 
group of countries in terms of GDP per capita, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. Extreme inequalities such as 
these raise the risk of social instability or, as Aron and Muellbauer (2005) observed it raises the risk to capital and 
                                                       
4 To judge the trajectory of the South African economy leading up to 1994 a counterfactual experience is required and an 
international comparison is one way of creating such a counterfactual. To that end we combined the groups selected by two 
leading sources on the comparative economic performance of the South African economy, i.e. Moll (1991) and Feinstein 
(2005) (the combined set of 33 countries is shown in Appendix A). Both authors collected a set of market economies that 
were broadly comparable at the start of the First World War which represents the historical point from where we trace the 
economy’s evolution.  
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income of future redistributive taxes and transfer payments. The provision of public services in South Africa, as 
proxied by the 70 percent of the population with access to safe water in 1995, though similar to that of Brazil (72 
percent), fell short of the similar provision in Mexico (83 percent) and Venezuela (79 percent), even if the 
relevant radius in figure 4 suggests that the South African situation was typical for the peer group.  
 
Finally, the proportion of export and manufacturing share of exports radii in figure 4 show that the South African 
economy was not out of step with this peer group where either the export proportion or the manufacturing share 
of exports was concerned. Furthermore, South Africa had a much higher export share than Argentina or Mexico 
(though not Venezuela). Rodrik (2006) also observed this relatively auspicious position for exports in the early 
nineties; he found a comparison between South Africa and Malaysia in 1988 suggestive.  
 
With the exception of the promising position of exports, the conditions for a rapid turnaround in economic 
growth were inauspicious in 1994: not only had the economy long been in relative (and ultimately absolute) 
decline but had fallen further behind in the productive employment of capital and labour; the attainment and 
quality of education varied greatly between racial groups; the same racial variation lies behind the unfavourably 
large fertility rate by 1994; while the Gini coefficient (for income) and proxy for the provision of public goods 
summarise the many inequalities at the time which (as human capital) presented a continuous economic burden, 
but also posed a longer term social and economic threat to the stability of the New South Africa. 
 
3.2 Growth accounting 
 
To  explain  South  Africa’s  economic  growth  over  the  past  ten  years,  a  first  step  is  to  identify  the  relative 
contributions of the major factors of production (capital and labour) and overall productivity. Such an exercise 
focuses on the proximate, rather than the more fundamental causes of growth and is based on standard growth 
accounting which provides a means of allocating observed total output growth between the contributions of the 
changes in factor inputs and total factor productivity (TFP).   
 
The methodology on which the standard growth accounting exercise is based may be described as follows (Barro, 
1999; Bosworth and Collins, 2003). Assuming a constant returns to scale production function: 
Y = AK
α LH ( )
1−α
                 (1) 
 
where Y = total output, K = capital stock, L = employment, H = average human capital measure, A = total 
factor productivity (TFP), α = output elasticity of capital and 1 - α = output elasticity of labour. 
 
The growth rate in output can then be decomposed into components associated with factor accumulation and 























Y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
α α 1           (2) 
Assuming perfect competition, α (and 1 - α) can be estimated by the share of capital (labour) in total income.  
The growth rate of TFP (i.e. 
A
A ￿ ) can then be derived, given time series data on Y, K and LH. 
 
In decomposing South Africa’s economic growth performance over the past ten years three alternative measures 
of the labour factor are utilized:  (i) assuming no contribution of changes in average human capital, i.e. H = 1.0 in 
equation  (1)  above;    (ii)  measuring  changes  in  average  human  capital  on  the  basis  of  the  average  years  of 
schooling of the South African labour force, i.e. H = (1.07)S where S = average years of schooling and assuming a 
seven  percent  return  to  schooling  for  each  year  (Bosworth  and  Collins,  2003);  and  (iii)  disaggregating 
employment into three categories of skills levels (highly skilled, skilled and semi- and unskilled), each weighted 
with its respective shares in the total wage bill (Fedderke, 2002). The relevant data are presented in table 5 below5.  
                                                       
5 An important caveat should be made at this point: labour market time series in South Africa should be used with caution as both the 
institutional environment of the labour market and the method of collecting the data changed significantly over time (Banerjee, Galiani, 
Levinsohn and Woolard, 2006). The same caution translates directly to the use of labour market time series in growth accounting as 
presented here. To the extent that the informal sector is underestimated in the labour series but captured in output, growth accounting 
risks overstating the contribution of TFP growth. Unlike the Labour Force Survey data (see, for example Burger and Yu, 2006), however,  
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Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 below shows the results of the growth accounting exercise and reveals the important role of multifactor 
productivity in South Africa’s economic growth performance over the past 2 decades. In the ten years after 1994, 
productivity  growth was  the  major  factor  in  the  growth  revival6,  which  contrasts  sharply  with  the  negative 
contribution to growth by productivity in the ten years before 1994. Though modest the contribution of capital 
to growth was slightly higher since 1994 than in the preceding decade, while labour’s contribution declined, 
though it remained positive. Labour’s contribution is higher in rows 3 to 6 suggesting that improvements in 
average human capital during this period had a positive, though modest, impact on growth via labour (see also, 
Fedderke, 2002) 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Recent studies on South Africa’s growth performance, Fedderke (2002) and Arora (2005), also highlighted the 
sharp turnaround in the contribution of multifactor productivity.  Their results are summarised in table 7 below. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The results in tables 6 and 7 pertain to the overall growth performance of the South African economy. Additional 
information on the proximate causes of South Africa’s growth revival may be gained by a similar analysis of the 
various individual production sectors and sub-sectors7.  Tables 8 and 9 shows the results of growth accounting 
for the main sectors of the economy (table 8) and the manufacturing sub sectors (table 9). 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
The results of the sectoral decomposition of South Africa’s growth performance over the past two decades 
suggest the following broad conclusions: (i) that multifactor productivity dominated capital and labour as positive 
proximate causes of the growth revival in the decade since 1994; (ii) while capital also contributed positively since 
1994, the growth rate of the labour input (in the formal sector) declined (except for two of the tertiary sub-
sectors:  wholesale  and  retail  trade  and  financial  intermediation);  and  (iii)  the  contribution  of  multifactor 
productivity was most pronounced in the secondary and tertiary sectors. The positive contribution by TFP in 
manufacturing since 1994 contrasts with the negative contribution by TFP during the nineties found by Fedderke 
(2002). Since Fedderke’s (2002) sample for the nineties did not run beyond 1997, the contrasting results suggest 
that the contribution of TFP growth to the growth revival gathered strength as the decade starting in 1995 
unfolded. Finally capital accumulation contributed most to growth in the construction and services sectors.  
 
Table 9 about here 
 
 
4.  THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL, LABOUR AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
In this section we combine lessons from the growth literature on South Africa with empirical evidence from the 
period under consideration to identify likely explanations for the relative contributions of investment and labour 
and productivity to growth in South Africa from 1995 to 2004. This method runs into a basic problem, i.e. the 
sample under consideration here overlaps at best for a few years (and sometimes not at all) with the samples used 
to examine the various drivers of economic growth in South Africa. This method requires the assumption that 
the systematic relationships driving capital, labour and productivity did not change fundamentally between the 
estimated sample and period under consideration.  
 
4.1 Explaining TFP growth 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
it is not possible to determine whether the Quantec data used here systematically over- or understate employment.   
6 South Africa’s TFP growth was also relatively high by world standards - Bosworth and Collins (2003) found that during the period 1990 
– 2000 total factor productivity for the world economy (as measured by 84 countries considered in their study) increased by 0.8 percent 
per annum. The comparable number for the 19 African countries considered in the Bosworth and Collins study was –0.5 percent. 
7 The results at the 3-digit sub-sectoral level should be interpreted with caution as the derivation of 3-digit data from data compiled at the 
2-digit level using the infrequently updated input-output data available for South Africa risks missing sectoral shifts and could misrepresent 
the correct contribution of the various factors (Fedderke, 2002).   
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The observation that TFP accounts for the bulk of the growth raises the question of explaining the rise in TFP 
growth. To identify the factors that have influenced TFP in South Africa it is, however, first necessary to give 
theoretical content to TFP growth: TFP growth might, for example, result from spill-over associated with capital 
investment (Romer, 1986), or from spill-overs associated with investment in human capital (Lucas, 1988) and yet 
a third alternative is that TFP growth might be due to explicit investment in research and development, often 
called Schumpeterian TFP growth (Fedderke, 2005).   
 
Fedderke (2006) proposed an econometric test for the relative importance of the two types of spill-over effects 
on TFP growth in the South African experience and the presence of Schumpeterian effects, using a panel data set 
of manufacturing sectors for the period 1970 to 1997. The study used a dynamic panel model with TFP as the 
dependent variable and a range of explanatory variables that might help to identify the various types of TFP 
growth, including growth in the capital stock for Romer-type spill-overs and human capital proxies for Lucas-
type spill-overs.  
 
Fedderke’s (2006) results indicated no evidence of Romer-type spill-overs and only modest evidence of Lucas-
type spill-overs associated with human capital proxies such as the proportion of matriculants taking mathematics 
and  science  and  the  proportion  of  university  degrees  awarded  in  the natural,  engineering  and mathematical 
sciences. There was, however, evidence of Schumpeterian effects on TFP, notably a positive effect from research 
and development (R&D) and from proxies of human capital investment. The human capital proxies that proved 
significant are those that offer some measure of the “quality” as opposed to the “quantity” of human capital 
(Fedderke, 2006).  
 
Fedderke (2005) has identified the “core determinants” of TFP growth in SA with the combination of these 
factors that determine the quality of human capital development and those determining R&D activity. This is a 
strong interpretation of the results given that they were derived with data for the manufacturing sector alone 
(representing only 20 percent of GDP). The generalisation of results from manufacturing to the entire economy 
is particularly difficult where TFP is concerned since, on Fedderke’s calculation elsewhere, the contribution of 
TFP to growth at the sectoral level was notably negative for manufacturing during the nineties while positive in 
services, mining and agriculture (Fedderke, 2002)8. These “core determinants” had shown marked declines in the 
quality of education and in R&D activity up to the democratic transition (Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz, 2003a) and 
Van  der  Berg has  shown that this decline  has continued through 2001 where  the  quality of human  capital 
development is concerned (Van der Berg, 2005). This suggests that the “core determinants” of TFP growth, as 
identified, cannot account for the rise in TFP growth observed across many sectors in the economy since 1994.  
 
The renewed interest in potential Schumpeterian effects on TFP growth has led the international literature9 over 
the last decade to re-consider the potential relationship between competition and innovation previously studied 
by,  for  example,  Scherer  (1967).  While  the  theoretical  literature  (e.g.  Dixit  and  Stiglitz,  1977)  suggests  that 
competition might depress innovation10, the empirical literature (e.g. Nickell, 1996) has found evidence of a 
positive relationship between competition and innovation. Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) 
have recently suggested a new model which predicts an inverted U-shape for the relationship between innovation 
and competition which is consistent both with their own empirical evidence (from a panel of listed UK firms 
from  1973-1994)  and  with  the  positive  relationships  found  by  empirical  studies  based  on  linear  regression 
models11. This prediction was also confirmed for manufacturing firms in South Africa by Aghion, Braun and 
Fedderke (2006).  
 
The potential impact of product market imperfections has also received some attention in the recent South 
African literature. First, Fedderke, Kularatne, and Mariotti (2007) quantified the extent of competition (or the 
                                                       
8 As mentioned above, this contrasting experience of manufacturing (found with data up to 1997) does not show up in the 
data for the period 1995-2004. 
9 Recent international papers include those by Nickell (1996), Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) and Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005). 
10 This negative relationship between competition and innovation is also consistent with the endogenous growth models of, 
for example, Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), where competition reduces innovation by lowering monopolistic 
rents. However, Nickell (1996) is right to observe that the theoretical literature also contains models predicting a positive 
effect for competition on innovation working through sharpening the incentives for managers, or perhaps by increasing the 
response of profitability to managerial effort, or by encouraging greater effort by workers who share in rents.  
11 The peak of the inverted-U (in terms of the measure of competitiveness) lies close to the median of Aghion et al.’s 
(2005) sample. With a median of 0.95 (where 1 means perfect competition) this data would yield a positive linear 
relationship between the measure of competitiveness and innovation.  
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lack thereof) in a panel of 3-digit South African manufacturing industries by using the technique of Roeger (1995) 
to calculate mark-ups of price over marginal cost.  In calculating these mark-ups Fedderke et al. (2007) control 
for a number of potential determinants of the mark-up (the business cycle, import and export penetration, market 
structure and industry competitiveness) and they use the dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation technique of 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) to allow for heterogeneity between sectors. The major result of this study is that 
mark-ups are substantially higher in South African manufacturing industries than in comparable US industries, 
despite the greater likelihood of competitive pressure from foreign firms in South Africa. And these results are 
robust with respect to the various control variables and to the inclusion of intermediate inputs in the calculation 
of marginal cost. An important further result by Fedderke et al. (2007), to which we return below, is that lower 
mark-ups are associated with industries that are more open to international trade. 
 
Aghion et al. (2006) builds on Fedderke et al. (2007) to confirm the robustness of the latter’s results across more 
data  sets  and against a  larger international  sample  and to investigate  the link between  competition  in these 
manufacturing industries and their productivity growth. To that end Aghion et al. (2006) used three data sets12 
(two at the industry level and one at the firm level) to calculate price-cost margins13 and labour productivity over 
time and across industries. Their first important result, which confirms that of Fedderke et al. (2007), is that 
competition  (as  measured  by  the  absence  of  pricing  power)  is  both  weak  in  South  African  manufacturing 
industries on an international comparison and that it has remained persistently weak over time (despite some 
evidence of increased competition for a period of the nineties, a trend which has since apparently reversed).  
 
To complete the link between competition and productivity growth Aghion et al. (2006) offer evidence of a 
positive and economically meaningful relationship between increased competition and labour productivity growth 
in South African manufacturing industries. However, Aghion et al.’s (2006) result cannot be an important link in 
understanding the relative increase in TFP growth observed at the aggregate level and across sectors in South 
Africa since 1994 as their measures of pricing power remain persistently high over a period in which TFP growth 
increased markedly as a contributor to GDP growth in South Africa.  
 
An important result by Fedderke et al. (2007) which does promise a partial explanation for the rise in TFP growth 
was mentioned above, namely that openness to international trade is associated with industries where mark-ups 
are lower. A second channel whereby openness might enhance TFP growth is the direct transfer of technology, 
either as information, or embodied in traded goods. It would be a partial explanation of the observed rise in TFP 
growth if the South African economy had become more open to trade since 1994 with the result of increasing 
competition and raising productivity.  
 
The South African government had embarked publicly on a programme of trade liberalisation since the early 
nineties and has persisted with this programme since 1994. While average unweighted tariffs have certainly been 
sharply reduced there is some doubt as to whether effective liberalisation had occurred in many of the most 
important  sectors  in  the  economy.  Fedderke  and  Vaze  (2001)  have,  for  example,  argued  that  the  effective 
protection for important sectors such as the financial sector and mining had risen during the nineties and that 
there had been little or no effective liberalisation from 1988 to 1998 in sectors representing just more than half of 
GDP. In contrast with Fedderke and Vaze (2001), Edwards and Lawrence (2006) reported evidence of effective 
liberalisation at the aggregate and sectoral level since the late 1980s. Arora and Bhundia (2003) had earlier offered 
evidence  with  a  similar  implication  based  on  the  sharp  rise  in  South  Africa’s  trade  ratio14  as  a  measure  of 
openness at the aggregate level, which they used in a time series model as one of two (weakly exogenous) factors 
to explain TFP growth in South Africa. And Jonsson and Subramanian (2001) had reported even stronger results, 
attributing 90% of TFP growth in South African between 1990 and 1997 to increased openness to trade. 15  
                                                       
12 These data sets are: (i) an industry-level panel data set for South Africa and 1000 other countries since the sixties from the 
UNIDO  (United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization)  International  Industry  Statistics  2004  database;  (ii)  an 
industry-level  panel data  set at  the 3  digit  level  for  1970-2004  from  South  Africa’s TIPS  (Trade  and  Industrial  Policy 
Strategies) data base and (iii) a firm-level panel since the early 1980s for listed companies in South Africa and 55 other 
countries from Worldscope.  
13 Aghion et al. (2006) confirmed the robustness of their results with two different measures of the price-cost margin and 
one direct measure of the mark-up.  
14 The trade ratio for South Africa was 49.2 percent in 1984 and had declined to 42 percent by 1994 before rising to 53.9 
percent by 2004 (Table 2).  
15 Jonsson and Subramanian (2001) identified four channels in the endogenous growth literature along which potentially 
positive effects for trade liberalisation on TFP growth might operate, namely: “(i) to employ a larger variety of intermediate 
goods  and  capital  equipment  which  could  enhance  the  productivity  of  its  other  resources;  (ii)  to  acquire  technology 
developed worldwide, especially in the form of embodied capital goods; (iii) to increase the variety of products produced and  
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To summarise, a large literature has identified a number of determinants of TFP growth in South Africa, but they 
do not easily explain the change in TFP growth that apparently occurred since 1994. The exception is openness 
to international trade. If the as yet controversial claims of a substantial liberalisation with respect to international 
trade  are  correct,  then  Fedderke  et  al.’s  (2007)  evidence  of  a  link  between  international  trade  and  local 
competition might combine with the evidence of a link between competition and production in Aghion et al. 
(2006) to offer an explanation for Arora and Bhundia’s (2003) claim that trade openness has been an important 
factor in the rise of TFP growth in South Africa. However, Arora and Bhundia (2003) also suggested a second 
explanatory factor for the rise of TFP growth, namely investment in machinery and equipment, the consideration 
of which requires turning the attention to capital accumulation and its explanatory factors since 1994.  
  
4.2  Explaining capital accumulation  
 
Even though the long run convergence of the economy depends on TFP and the latter has lately accounted for a 
larger proportion of economic growth in South Africa, capital retains a prominent position in any comprehensive 
account of economic growth in South Africa (for example, Fedderke, 2005). In Robert Chirinko’s (1993) review 
of the literature on the empirical modelling of business investment spending he identified three important areas 
for the research agenda on this topic: firstly, “financial structure and liquidity constraints”, secondly, “additional 
dynamics” especially the connection between irreversibility and uncertainty, and finally, “an expanded view of the 
firm and investment decisions”. The subsequent literature on the modelling of investment can be read through 
the lens of the research agenda mapped out by Chirinko (1993) and the South African contributions to that 
literature are summarised under three corresponding headings.  
 
Financial structure and liquidity constraints 
Financial structure, and especially the possibility of credit constraints, has been an important topic in models of 
investment expenditure in the South African literature of the last decade.  This literature considers whether the 
financial structure and/or credit constraints have been an important constraint on investment expenditure in 
South Africa, despite the fairly high degree of financial sector development for an emerging market economy 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Aron and Muellbauer, 2005).  
 
Du  Toit and Moolman  (2004)  used  a time series model (with  a sample  from 1970 to 2000)  of  a modified 
neoclassical investment function to incorporate a constraint on the internal and external sources for finance16. 
The equilibrium capital stock is determined by the user cost of capital in their model, but financial constraints 
affect the adjustment towards that equilibrium in the short run. Their model under-predicted actual investment 
post-1994, driven by the short-run impact of low saving, precarious external reserves and a high user cost of 
capital. However, the user cost of capital has since declined (Aron and Muellbauer, 2006) and external reserves 
have risen strongly, the combination of which is consistent with the rise in aggregate investment expenditure 
reported in table 2. 
 
Fedderke (2004) proposed a model in the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) tradition to incorporate adjustment costs and 
both sectoral and systemic uncertainty as its main features. He also included a proxy for credit rationing – the 
ratio of gross operating surplus to total fixed capital stock – but found that this variable made no significant 
contribution to the model estimated on a panel of 3 digit manufacturing sectors for the period 1970 to 1997 with 
the pooled mean group estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) to allow for short run heterogeneity together with 
homogeneity of the long run coefficients.  
 
A  second  branch  of  this  literature  models  investment  expenditure  as  part  of  a  system  of  equations  with 
investment  expenditure  and  real  GDP  growth  amongst  the  jointly  endogenous  variables.  Kularatne  (2002) 
suggests  two  models  in  this  tradition  for  South  African  growth  and  investment  and  finds  a  significant 
contribution for two financial sector variables (the ratio of private credit extension to GDP and a measure of 
stock market liquidity) to GDP growth, but only indirectly via the investment rate. He also finds that financial 
deepening through financial markets has been complementary to financial deepening via the banking sector in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
consumed; and (iv) to improve the efficiency with which resources are used, which can help to change market structures and 
reduce markups, thereby imparting dynamic efficiency benefits” (Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001: 198-199). 
16 Du Toit and Moolman (2004) proxied internal constraints with saving by households, corporates and government while 
external constraints included net foreign capital flows and the change in gold and other foreign exchange reserves. None of 
these proxies have an unambiguous interpretation as a financial constraint in domestic investment. Their model also included 
a time dummy for the period of international sanctions (1985-1992).  
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South Africa. Kularatne (2002) and Fedderke (2005) both suggest that the absence of a direct impact on the GDP 
growth is consistent with credit rationing. However, the same evidence is also consistent with many alternative 
hypotheses, including model misspecification (Kularatne, 2002). 
 
In summary, there is no consensus yet on the influence of financial sector or liquidity constraints on investment 
expenditure  in  South  Africa  and  the  literature,  except  for  Kularatne  (2002),  does  not  support  any  strong 
statements about the role of the financial sector in the pattern of investment expenditure since 1994. In contrast, 
a number of papers found a significant role for the user cost of capital in explaining investment expenditure at 
various levels of aggregation in South Africa. By implication the real interest rate, the rate of depreciation and the 
corporate tax rate become relevant explanatory factors for capital accumulation. Fedderke, Kayemba, Henderson, 
Mariotti and Vaze (2001b) suggested from their evidence that the user cost of capital had been an important 
constraint  on  investment  in  South  Africa  during  the  seventies,  but  had  become  less  so  over  time.  This  is 
consistent with Aron and Muellbauer’s (2006) calculation of the tax adjusted real market interest rate for South 
Africa post-2000 which compares favourably with a sample of industrialised and developing countries; evidence 
that supports Aron and Muellbauer’s (2006) claim that inflation targeting has not entailed debilitating high real 
interest rates.  
 
Uncertainty and irreversibility  
Following Dixit and Pindyck’s (1994) influential contribution, the explicit modelling of uncertainty has become a 
feature of empirical investment functions. Adding the restrictive assumption of irreversibility to the assumption 
of uncertainty leads this kind of model to predict that higher uncertainty will lower investment expenditure, even 
under risk neutrality. However, a less restrictive assumption of downward sloping demand curves yields the same 
prediction when combined with uncertainty (Nickell, 1978) and the empirical literature provides broad support 
for the hypothesis that uncertainty lowers investment internationally (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005).  
 
Consistent  with  the  international  literature,  Bleaney  (1994),  Fielding  (1997)  and  Fedderke  (2004)  all  report 
significant adverse effects for uncertainty on investment expenditure. Fedderke’s (2004) results are particularly 
interesting  for  showing  the  separate  contributions  of  both  sectoral  uncertainty  (measured  as  the  standard 
deviation of real value added per sector) and systemic uncertainty17. As a proxy for the systemic uncertainty 
Fedderke (2004) used a political instability index proposed by Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001a). While this 
measure contributed significantly to the variation of investment in Fedderke’s (2004) sample, 1970-1997, it has 
since effectively declined to zero, based as it is on measures such as the “number of prosecutions under the 
Defence Acts and Emergency regulations”, “the number of prosecutions for faction fighting”, “the number of 
people proscribed and/or banned under the Suppression of Communism Act 1951” and so on (Fedderke et al., 
2001a).  
 
It is unlikely, therefore, that this measure of systemic risk contributes much to the explanation of investment in 
South Africa since 1994, though the absence of such uncertainty might contribute to an explanation of the 
investment recovery since 1994. Aron and Muellbauer (2005) also list systemic risk factors that have declined 
since 1994, including: closing the forward book, the adoption of inflation targeting, the recovery of economic 
growth and prudent fiscal policy18. However, there are also factors that might have increased systemic risk since 
1994, such as: fears of the future protection of property rights and of future taxation, high crime rates, high 
HIV/AIDS incidence and inflexible labour markets (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005).  The sectoral uncertainty, as 
measured  by  Fedderke  (2004),  has  not  declined  uniformly  either  and  remains  a  relevant  factor  influencing 
investment decisions in the manufacturing sectors.  
 
An expanded view of the firm and its investment decision 
A  third  plank  in  Chirinko’s  (1993)  view  of  the  desired  research  programme  for  research  in  investment 
expenditure was to see the investment decision in the context of the many other decisions taken continuously by 
firms (Chirinko, 1993: 1904). The South African literature has also advanced along these dimensions over the last 
ten years: firstly, by expanding the use of simultaneous equation models, secondly, by examining the interaction 
between the labour market and investment decisions, thirdly by considering the interaction between private and 
                                                       
17 Though Fedderke (2004) does not show whether the impact of uncertainty, as measured, would be robust to the inclusion 
of year dummies.  
18  Mariotti  (2002)  presented  further  evidence  that  poor  macroeconomic  policy  (a  high  proportion  of  government 
consumption relative to GDP) and macroeconomic volatility (a high inflation rate) are associated with lower growth in South 
Africa. Equating a high proportion of government consumption relative to GDP with poor macroeconomic policy is, 
however, controversial as it assumes that government consumption is per se destabilising.  
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public investment, notably infrastructure, and finally, by studying the influence of international capital flows.  
 
Kularatne (2002) demonstrated joint endogeneity between growth, investment and liquidity, Mariotti (2002) also 
exploited the joint endogeneity between growth and investment to trace the impact of certain macroeconomic 
policy outcomes on growth, and most recently, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) have built a theoretical case, supported 
with econometric evidence, for the joint endogeneity of investment and political instability in South Africa.  
 
Turning to the labour market, Fedderke (2004) focussed on the effect of human capital on the formation of 
physical capital. He used the ratio of skilled and highly-skilled to unskilled and semi-skilled workers per sector as 
a measure of the human capital content in the sector, and found this skills ratio to be positively and significantly 
related to investment. His result suggests a complementarity between human capital and investment in physical 
capital in the manufacturing sector; a result with policy implications given the dominant role of the public sector 
in education in South Africa.  
 
The impact of public sector investment is not restricted to human capital though and there might be important 
crowding-in or crowding-out effects for public investment in physical capital. Both the composition and size of 
public sector investment are relevant to the likely impact thereof on private investment. If public investment is 
large relative to the tax base then the resulting debt burden and likelihood of either rising future taxes or future 
financial instability might depress investment expenditure. In contrast, public investment projects that lower 
transactions costs for private business or solve public goods-type problems might show a complementary effect 
on private investment.  
 
Agénor’s (2004) summary of the empirical literature for developing countries provides broad support for the 
complementarity thesis on public investment. In the South African literature both Fielding (1997) and Fedderke 
(2000) found evidence of crowding in by public investment.  A more recent literature on South Africa considers 
one type of capital often financed by the public sector in South Africa: infrastructure. The first steps were taken 
by Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) who reported evidence of a feedback relationship between GDP growth 
and infrastructure investment from a newly constructed database measuring the stock of infrastructure over time.    
 
In a more recent study Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz (2006) reported much stronger evidence that infrastructure 
investment  might  lead  output  growth  in  South  Africa,  with  the  feedback  from  growth  to  infrastructure 
discovered to be weaker in this second study.  They found not only a direct impact for infrastructure on growth, 
but also an indirect channel via higher private sector investment in productive capital. These results are especially 
important given the dramatic slowdown in infrastructure investment in South Africa since the seventies which 
has seen the country fall behind other middle income countries along a number of infrastructure dimensions 
(Bogetić  and  Fedderke,  2005).  The  continued  decline  of  public  infrastructure  over  the  decade  since  1994, 
especially relative to an economy which had returned to growth by the late nineties, might on the evidence in 
Fedderke et al. (2006) have acted as a drag on growth. This is especially so given Fedderke and Bogetić’s (2006) 
evidence  of  a  positive  relationship  between  infrastructure  in  South  Africa  and  TFP  in  the  country’s 
manufacturing industries. After controlling for the likely simultaneity between infrastructure and growth they 
found economically and statistically significant spill-overs from infrastructure to TFP.   
 
Up to this point we have only considered domestic aspects that might influence capital accumulation in South 
Africa, but there has long been an important international dimension to investment decisions in South Africa. We 
have already seen how such international influences offer one of the few channels for understanding the rise in 
TFP  growth  since  1994.  And  the  empirical  literature  has  also  tried  to  capture  the  impact  of  international 
influences on domestic investment: in the form of an index of the country’s international position (based on the 
exchange rate, trade performance, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and relative export prices) by 
du Toit and Moolman (2004) and by including the gold price, terms of trade, real capital flows and the financial 
Rand discount as explanatory factors in Bleaney (1994). 
 
An alternative approach is to model the determinants of capital flows to South Africa as has been done by 
Fedderke and Liu (2002) for 4 different measures of capital flows and Fedderke and Romm (2005) for foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The former study considers the potential impact of the exchange rate adjusted interest 
rate differential, the rate of domestic economic growth, a dummy variable for the financial liberalisation of the 
early nineties and various risk measures on total capital flows in a time series model for the sample 1960 to 1995. 
In addition to the expected portfolio theoretic results they found that net capital flows to South Africa had been 
adversely affected by political risk and (temporarily) by financial liberalisation.  
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Fedderke and Romm (2005) derived two important results: first, FDI contributes positively to economic growth 
in  SA  by complementing  domestic  capital,  interpreted   as  evidence  of technological  spill-over from foreign 
capital. While FDI crowds out domestic investment in the short run, this is not true in the long run. Second, they 
identified factors associated with FDI flows to South Africa empirically, including: corporate tax rates, wage 
costs,  the  openness  of  the  economy  and  the  protection  of  property  rights.  While  corporate  tax  rates,  the 
openness of the economy and the protection of property rights have made South Africa more attractive for FDI 
flows over the last decade, wage costs may well have been a drag on FDI (Fedderke, 2005).  
 
The change in the contribution of foreign saving to the financing of domestic investment from a negative in the 
period prior to 1994 to a positive in the past ten years is an important part of the benefit of South Africa’s 
political transition (table 3 above).  During the period 1985 to 1993 South Africa experienced a near-absolute 
balance of payments constraint following the debt crises in 1985 and the financial sanctions imposed on the 
Apartheid government.  The political transition in 1994 re-opened the international financial markets to South 
Africa allowing for a normalization of the capital account of the balance of payments.   
 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  generally  expected  that  foreign  capital  inflows,  especially  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI), would contribute considerably to the financing of investment. However, FDI flows have 
somewhat disappointed in the ten years since 1994 (see table 4 above). Portfolio investment, on the other hand, 
accounted for 42 percent of total capital flows to South Africa since 1994. The conventional view in the literature 
is that portfolio flows are more unstable than (longer term) FDI (Agénor, 2004), but this convention has not 
gone unchallenged (Claessens, Dooley and Warner, 1995).  
 
In summary, the empirical literature on investment expenditure in South Africa suggests that the recovery in 
investment since 1994 could be attributed to a combination of the following factors: lower systemic risk, lower 
user cost of capital and by an increased inflow of foreign capital, which has been associated with lower risk and 
macroeconomic policy prudence. Lower corporate taxes and institutional protection for property rights have also 
been associated with improved FDI. 
 
4.3  Explaining employment growth  
 
Explaining employment behaviour in the South African economy in the period since 1994 is no simple matter; 
not only is there little consensus in the literature on the various potential causes of South African employment 
growth, but the basic statistics on employment and unemployment are also controversial.  In discussing the 
possible  determinants  of  employment  the  following  are  considered  briefly:  output  growth,  wages  and  trade 
liberalization and a number of others are noted. This discussion is preceded by a brief consideration of the 
problematic nature of South Africa’s labour market statistics. 
 
The  statistics  on  South  African  employment  and  other  labour  market  characteristics  has  been  subjected  to 
considerable scrutiny in the literature and generally found wanting (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996; Klasen 
and  Woolard,  1999)19.  Earlier  analyses  of  employment,  which  were  based  on  formal  sector  statistics  only, 
suggested  that  South  Africa  was  experiencing  “jobless”  growth  in  the  1990’s  (i.e.  declines  in  employment 
associated  with  positive  economic  growth)  but  more  recent  analyses  (which  also  provide  for  informal 
employment) provided a more positive picture of the employment generating capacity of the economy (Bhorat 
and Oosthuizen, 2005; Burger and Woolard, 2005).  These problems with compiling and interpreting South 
Africa’s labour market statistics complicate considerably empirical analyses of the causes of employment growth. 
 
The standard potential determinants of employment in a market economy include output growth and (real) 
wages.  As far as output growth is concerned, South Africa’s performance since 1994 was insufficient to support 
the  rate  of  employment  growth  required  to  address  the  growing  unemployment  problem20.    Furthermore, 
Fedderke  et  al.  (2001b:  498)  added  that  “…economic  growth  in  South Africa  has  been  poor  at  generating 
additional employment ever since the 1970’s”. Indeed, some of the earlier research (for example, Loots, 1998) 
suggested that the employment elasticity of output growth (at least with respect to formal sector employment) 
was in a secular decline. But this, too, has been disputed and some of the more recent research, for example 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2005), argue that employment growth at least kept pace with the growth of the working 
age population. 
                                                       
19 See also footnote 5 above. 
20 It should be noted, however, that increases in labour force participation have substantially exceeded the rate of growth of 
the working age population in South Africa since the late 1990s (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2005).  
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The impact of real wages on employment has been considered in a number of studies, generally indicating that 
labour demand in South Africa is relatively wage elastic.  Fallon and Lucas (1998), for example, estimated a wage 
elasticity  of  employment  of  -0.71  and  Nattrass  (2000:  84)  refers  to  estimates  ranging  from  -0.66  to  -0.85.  
Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2003b) found even higher wage elasticities of -1.97 in manufacturing and elasticities for 
unskilled  labour  in the formal  labour market ranging  from  -2.00  to -2.23.   Consequently, if  real wages had 
increased substantially since 1994, this could (at least partly) explain the relatively slow employment growth, or in 
the Fedderke’s (2005: 22) words: “…labour mispricing continues to be an important factor in South Africa’s poor 
track record of job creation …”. Unfortunately the evidence on real wages remains ambiguous.  Kingdon and 
Knight (2005), for example, reports both increases and decreases in real wages in the period 1995 to 2003 from 
different data sources.  Banerjee et al. (2006) and Burger and Yu (2006)21 in turn, suggest that real wages were 
largely stagnant during this period.  
 
Trade liberalization, which is generally associated with improved economic growth and employment performance 
(for example, Dollar and Kraay, 2001) has been identified as a negative factor in South Africa’s employment 
experience in the 1990’s, particularly with respect to unskilled labour.  A strong proponent of this view is Nattrass 
(2000) who identifies competition from low wage, labour intensive exporting countries and the shift to capital- 
and  skill-intensive  productive  sectors  under  the  impact  of  globalization  as  important  factors  holding  back 
employment growth.  Barker (2003: 186) adds two additional reasons: (i) a relative increase in demand for skilled 
workers (and a decrease in the demand for unskilled labour) as a result of the drive to increased productivity by 
South African firms to improve their international competitive position, and (ii) the increase in the capital- and 
skill intensity of production of natural resource-based products which feature strongly in South Africa’s export 
mix.   
 
However,  the  proposition  that  trade  liberalization  has  impacted  (significantly)  negatively  on  unskilled 
employment in South Africa has also been challenged.  Edwards (2001) offered two counter arguments, first that 
other factors than trade liberalization (such as, e.g. changes in domestic demand, labour regulations and relative 
wages) may have been responsible for sectoral shifts away from unskilled labour and second, the creation of 
employment in export-producing firms.  Finally, Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2003b) shows that trade liberalization 
has resulted in a positive impact on labour demand but that the associated technological changes have been 
labour-saving.  
 
Other factors which could have acted as a brake on employment growth (but which remain controversial in the 
literature)  might  be  grouped  under  three  headings:  The  first  group  include  labour  market  institutions,  for 
example, labour market inflexibility as a result of the relatively strong position of labour unions in South Africa 
and  new  labour  legislation enacted after 1994 (Barker,  2003;  Burger  and Woolard, 2005) and  the mismatch 
between the required skills levels and the labour force and employment (Burger and Woolard, 2005; Pauw, 
Oosthuizen and Van Der Westhuizen, 2006).  A second group of factors are sectoral, including concerns over a 
perceived  increase  in  the  capital  intensity  of  production  (Bhorat  and  Oosthuizen,  2005; Pauw  et  al., 2006), 
increased  concentration in the  manufacturing sector  (Fedderke  and  Szalontai, 2003)  and sectoral changes in 
demand (i.e. from mining and agriculture to services) (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2005; Banerjee et al., 2006).  
Finally, the labour market impact of the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa (Arndt and Lewis, 2000; 
Laubscher, Smit and Visagie, 2001).  
 
In  summary,  the  empirical  literature  on  South  Africa’s  employment  growth  performance  has  considered  a 
number  of  possible  determinants,  including  output  growth,  real  wages,  trade  liberalization,  labour  market 
flexibility, sectoral demand shifts, skills and capital intensity issues and HIV/AIDS.  Furthermore, the lacklustre 
employment growth contributed relatively modestly to overall economic growth. Though a considerable literature 
tries to explain this labour market outcome, many questions remain unresolved. It is clear, however, that the same 
issues identified above with respect to capital and productivity, namely, the increasing openness of the economy 
and factor pricing, in this case real wages, have played a crucial role in the evolution of the South African labour 
market since 1994.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Having unpacked and examined the various contributing factors to economic growth in South African since 1994 
                                                       
21 However, it should be noted that real wages (of especially unskilled labour) increased substantially in the 10 year prior to 
1994, raising the level of real wages.  
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we are now in a position to reassemble the message from the constituent parts.  Compared with a peer group of 
countries the initial conditions for a dramatic growth recovery in South Africa were inauspicious in 1994. The 
economy had been in relative decline for decades while the legacy of apartheid was particularly evident in a very 
high level of income inequality (with the associated risks of punitive taxes or social unrest) and in the highly 
unequal  level  and  especially  poor  quality  of  education  across  the  different  population  groups.  Meanwhile 
demographic factors (e.g. a relatively high fertility rate) placed pressure on the labour market.  
 
Fifty  percent  or  more  (depending  on  the  assumptions  used  in  the  growth  accounting)  of  South  Africa’s 
subsequent economic recovery can be attributed to total factor productivity growth. With very few exceptions 
this aggregate level result also holds at the level of sectors and (the manufacturing) sub-sectors in the South 
African economy. While it is difficult to account for this recovery in productivity growth, the most compelling 
evidence reported here finds the economy’s increasing openness to international trade to be the leading cause of 
rising productivity locally. Authors such as Jonsson and Subramanian (2001) explained this by appeal to the 
endogenous  growth  literature,  but  Fedderke  et  al.  (2007)  added  evidence  that  this  effect  might  be  working 
through increased competition at the sectoral level. It remains for future research to examine along which of the 
candidate routes (see footnote 15) trade openness had encouraged productivity growth in South Africa since 
1995.  
   
Trade openness, as well as openness to international capital flows, were also important factors explaining the 
revival of investment expenditure as a contributing factor to growth in the post 1994 period. Other factors that 
have been associated with higher investment rates in South Africa, such as a lower user cost of capital and lower 
systemic and sectoral uncertainty are also consistent with the modest recovery in investment seen over the last 
decade. Factor prices and the increasing openness of the economy also feature strongly in the labour market 
literature and attempts to explain the lacklustre performance of employment growth since 1994. In contrast with 
investment where the factor price has been declining, the issue in the labour market literature is the suspected 
high level of real wages and the nuanced effect of trade liberalisation on labour demand.   
 
In  summary,  the  evidence  offered  here  suggests  that  it  was  openness  (to  trade  and  capital  flows),  lower 
uncertainty and lower interest rates that explain South Africa’s growth recovery since 1994. It is a result with 
policy implications: the lower systematic risk associated with the post-1994 political dispensation have economic 
as well as social value, and the orthodox macroeconomic policies of this period have also lowered overall risk and 
the user cost of capital. Finally, increasing openness to trade and capital flows has been key to the economic 
recovery, a result which suggests gains from further steps in this direction.  








Table A.1 lists the countries used in the international comparison of section 3.1. This 
set was constructed by combining the groups suggested respectively by Feinstein (2005) 
and Moll (1991) for such a comparison and the second column of Table A.1 shows 
whether Moll, Feinstein or both included the relevant country in their comparative sets. 
There was very considerable overlap between these two authors, and extending the 
Feinstein (2005) selection by 3 countries (Sri Lanka, Turkey and Venezuela) gave the 
union of the two sets.  
 
Table A.2 shows the values taken by the proxies of initial conditions used in section 3.1. 
for: development of human capital, the fertility rate, access to public services, income 
inequality,  the  export  share  in  GDP  and  the  share  of  manufactured  goods  within 
exports. The peer group is the same group of 33 countries used for the long term per 
capita GDP comparison less those countries which were unambiguously developed 
countries by 1994. This left a group of 21 developing countries in the control group as 
listed in table A.2.  
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Figure 1   Real GDP per capita since 1960 (in 2000 prices) 
Data source:  SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
 
 
Figure 2    SA real GDP and real GDP per capita growth rates: 1980-2004 
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Figure  3    Relative performance of the South African economy (GDP per capita) 
 
Source: calculated using data from Penn World Table version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002) and 
Maddison  (2002).  The  data  set  was  constructed  by  combining  the  groups  suggested  respectively  by 
Feinstein (2005) and Moll (1991). There was very considerable overlap between these two authors, and 
extending the Feinstein (2005) selection by 3 countries (Sri Lanka, Turkey and Venezuela) gave the union 
of the two sets as shown in Appendix A. 
The box plot is of standard construction (see for example, Hamilton, 1996) and shows the middle 50 
percent of the data inside each box, the median as the solid line within each box and the outliers as dots 
beyond the whiskers (which mark a distance of 1.5 times the inter-quartile range above the 3rd quartile and 
below the first quartile).Each box shows the distribution of GDP per capita relative to the USA for the 
sample countries for the particular year shown on the x-axis. The dotted line shows the position of SA 
within the distribution for each of the years.  
  
  10 
Figure  4    Initial conditions measured by social and economic indicators  
 
Data source: calculated using data from World Development reports (1995; 1996; 1998; 2001) as shown in 
Appendix A. 
The  peer  group  is  the  same  group  of  33  countries  used  in  figure  3  less  those  countries  which  were 
unambiguously developed countries by 1994. This left a group of 21 developing countries in the control 
group. All of the conditions were assessed in 1995, with the exception of fertility (1994) the export share of 
GDP (1994), the manufacturing share of exports (1995) and the Gini coefficients which are mostly based 
on censuses from1994 to 1996 as shown in the Appendix.  The data for each item is scaled from 1 to 100 
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Table 1 Sectoral distribution of production (GDP% at nominal basic prices and % change in basic 2000 prices)  
  % of GDP  Average annual % 
change 




           
Primary sector  17.5  11.9  10.1  0.5  0.3 
   - Agriculture, forestry and fishing  4.8  4.6  3.1  3.9  0.4 
   - Mining and quarrying  12.7  7.3  7.0  -0.6  0.3 
           
Secondary sector  30.5  27.7  23.8  -0.03  2.7 
   - Manufacturing  23.0  20.9  19.1  -0.1  2.8 
   - Electricity, gas and water  3.7  3.6  2.4  4.0  1.6 
   - Construction (contractors)  3.7  3.1  2.3  -2.6  3.5 
           
Tertiary sector  52.0  60.4  66.1  1.4  3.8 
   - Wholesale and retail trade, catering 
  and accommodation 
11.6  14.2  14.1  -0.1  4.3 
   - Transport, storage and 
  communication 
9.0  8.7  9.8  1.6  6.9 
   - Financial intermediation, insurance, 
  real estate and business services 
13.1  16.0  21.0  1.8  5.2 
   - Community, social and personal 
  services 
18.3  21.5  21.2  2.0  1.1 
           
GDP at basic prices  100  100  100  0.9  3.1 
Data source:  SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
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Table 2   Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP at current prices and % change in constant 2000 prices) 
  % of Total Fixed Investment  Average annual % 
change 
  1984  1994  2004  1985-1994  1995-2004 
           
Investment by type of organization:           
-  General government  23.2  15.5  16.8  -5.5  4.6 
-  Public corporations  18.2  11.5  10.9  -6.0  5.0 
-  Private  58.6  72.9  72.3  -0.1  5.1 
           
Investment by type of asset:           
-  Residential buildings  15.0  10.3  10.2  -5.1  3.2 
-  Non-residential buildings  13.0  12.2  10.1  -2.0  1.4 
-  Construction works  17.3  14.3  15.6  -3.5  4.0 
-  Transport equipment  10.8  15.0  13.2  -2.7  4.6 
-  Machinery and other equipment  41.2  44.2  47.0  -0.5  7.0 
           
Investment by kind of economic activity:           
-  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  3.6  4.0  3.3  -1.4  0.4 
-  Mining and quarrying  10.2  9.0  7.9  -2.0  3.5 
-  Manufacturing  18.8  23.3  20.1  0.1  4.5 
-  Electricity, gas and water  16.4  7.5  4.6  -9.5  0.1 
-  Construction (contractors)  1.5  1.1  1.8  -5.6  11.3 
- Wholesale and retail, trade, catering and 
   accommodation  6.2  6.4  7.5  -1.9  6.2 
-  Transport, storage and communication  10.1  11.1  13.5  -2.3  8.0 
-  Financial intermediation, insurance, real 
estate and business services  21.3  23.4  24.5  -1.7  5.1 
-  Community, social and personal services  11.9  14.1  17.1  0.2  6.2 
           
Gross fixed capital formation*  24.0  15.2  16.2  -2.3  5.1 
           
*% of GDP 





Table 3  Financing of gross capital formation (as % of GDP, period averages) 
  1985 – 1994  1995 – 2004 
     
Saving by households  3.0  0.8 
Corporate saving  5.5  4.9 
Saving by general government  -3.9  -3.1 
Consumption of fixed capital  15.7  12.8 
Gross domestic saving  20.2  15.5 
Foreign investment  -2.5  2.4 
Gross capital formation  17.7  17.9 
Data source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
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Table 4  Foreign capital inflows (average % of GDP) 
  1985-1994  1995-2004 
     
Direct investment  -0.41  0.86 
Portfolio investment  0.18  1.17 
Other investment  -1.17  0.58 
Total capital flows (incl. Unrecorded transactions)  -2.08  2.78 
Data source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
 
Table 5  Factors of production and income shares: average annual % changes and average shares 
  1985 – 1994  1995 – 2004 
Fixed capital stock (2000 prices)  1.01  1.37 
Employment (total)a  1.14  1.13 
  - Highly skilled b  4.03 (50.7)  2.07 (49.8) 
  - Skilled b  1.85 (34.6)  1.82 (34.7) 
  - Semi- and unskilled b  0.23 (14.7)  0.37(15.4) 
Average years of schoolingb  1.8  0.9 
Wage income sharec  0.57  0.54 
Capital income sharec  0.43  0.46 
The figures in brackets represent average wage bill shares. 
a Formal and informal sector employment as estimated by Quantec Research on the basis of the Survey of 
Employment and Earnings (P0271), the Survey of Employment Earnings (P0275), and the Labour Force 
Survey (P0210). 
b Average annual percentage change, based on the 2000 Census. 




Table 6  Sources of output growth in South Africa: 1985 – 2004 








No provision for human 
capital  1985-1994  0.8  0.45  0.63  -0.28 
  1995-2004  3.1  0.62  0.62  1.86 
           
Human capital based on 
average years of schooling  1985-1994  0.8  0.45  1.11  -0.76 
  1995-2004  3.1  0.62  0.88  1.60 
           
Human capital represented by 
3 skills levels  1985-1994  0.8  0.45  1.49  -1.14 
  1995-2004  3.1  0.62  0.95  1.53 
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Table 7  Recent studies on the sources of output growth in South Africa 








Arora (2005)  1980-1994  1.2  0.8  0.7  -0.4 
  1995-2003  2.9  0.7  0.9  1.3 
           
Fedderke (2002)  1970s  3.21  2.54  1.17  -0.49 
  1980s  2.20  1.24  0.62  0.34 
  1990s  0.94  0.44  -0.58  1.07 




Table 8    Sources of output growth in South Africa:  Sectoral: 1985-2004 
























                 
Primary sector  0.47  0.31  0.51  0.32  -0.43  -0.75  0.39  0.74 
   - Agriculture, forestry and fishing  3.89  0.44  -1.38  -0.18  -0.04  -0.35  2.55  0.61 
   - Mining and quarrying  -0.58  0.26  1.45  0.50  -1.07  -1.37  -0.96  1.13 
                 
Secondary sector  -0.03  2.73  0.21  0.31  -0.50  -1.22  0.26  3.64 
   - Manufacturing  -0.1  2.78  0.49  0.7  -0.47  -0.67  -0.12  2.75 
   - Electricity, gas and water  3.95  1.61  -0.29  -0.86  -1.55  -0.92  5.79  3.39 
   - Construction (contractors)  -2.64  3.48  -0.83  1.65  -0.36  -3.44  -1.45  -1.61 
                 
Tertiary sector  1.41  3.79  0.54  0.72  0.24  0.97  0.64  2.10 
   - Wholesale and retail trade, 
  catering and accommodation 
-0.11  4.3  0.48  1.07  0.27  1.18  -0.86  2.05 
   - Transport, storage and 
communication 
1.58  6.85  0.09  0.97  2.8  -1.6  4.29  7.48 
   - Financial intermediation, 
  insurance, real estate and business 
  services 
1.77  5.16  0.76  0.76  4.11  3.26  -3.10  1.14 
Data source: Quantec 
 
Table 9  Sources of output growth in South Africa:  Manufacturing sub-sectors: 1985-2004 
























                 
Food, beverages and tobacco  -0.01  0.86  1.05  0.12  -0.24  -1.28  -0.82  2.02 
Textiles, clothing and leather  -1.89  0.54  -0.60  -0.15  -1.20  -1.59  -0.09  2.28 
Wood and paper; publishing and 
printing  0.54  1.34  -0.91  1.20  0.20  -0.05  1.25  0.19 
Petroleum  1.06  5.36  1.02  0.80  0.24  0.12  -0.20  4.44 
Other non-metallic mineral products  -0.49  0.41  -1.17  -0.03  -0.06  -1.80  0.74  2.24 
Metals, metal products, machinery 
and equipment  -2.29  3.44  0.58  0.56  -1.49  -0.46  -1.38  3.34 
Electrical machinery and apparatus  -0.33  2.95  -0.82  -0.51  -0.87  -3.72  1.36  7.18 
Radio, TV, instruments, watches and 
clocks  1.83  -1.22  -0.71  0.80  1.73  -0.58  0.81  -1.44 
Transport equipment  -2.80  4.72  1.58  2.32  -1.36  0.12  -2.02  2.28 
Furniture and other equipment  7.97  1.98  2.05  3.90  1.03  0.28  4.89  -2.20 
Data source: Qauntec 
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Table A.1  Data used in the cross country comparison 
Country  Source  GDP per capita relative to the USA 




































Argentina  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  72  61  60  55  50  27  33 
Australia  Feinstein (2005)  108  95  87  90  81  76  76 
Austria  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  65  38  60  69  75  75  70 
Brazil  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  15  15  19  22  30  24  22 
Canada  Feinstein (2005)  84  83  82  82  91  85  81 
Chile  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  50  40  31  31  26  23  29 
Columbia  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  23  21  20  18  20  19  16 
Algeria  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  .  .  20  18  30  19  17 
Egypt  Feinstein (2005)  14  16  13  13  14  12  12 
Spain  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  43  28  38  55  53  54  53 
Finland  Feinstein (2005)  40  48  62  69  72  77  69 
Ghana  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  14  12  14  10  7  5  4 
Greece  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  30  20  33  49  54  44  44 
Indonesia  Feinstein (2005)  17  9  6  5  9  11  11 
Ireland  Feinstein (2005)  .  37  41  44  46  55  76 
Italy  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  48  38  56  68  69  73  64 
Japan  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  26  21  38  72  73  84  73 
Korea (South)  Feinstein (2005)  17  8  12  16  22  38  42 
Sri Lanka  Moll (1991), Moll (1991)  16  14  12  9  8  9  11 
South Africa  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  30  38  37  38  40  30  23 
Morocco  Feinstein (2005)  15  12  10  13  14  13  12 
Mexico  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  33  30  33  33  38  28  27 
Malaysia  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  17  16  19  17  24  24  26 
Nigeria  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  .  6  8  5  7  4  2 
New Zealand  Feinstein (2005)  97  98  94  80  65  61  56 
Pakistan  Feinstein (2005)  .  9  7  8  6  7  6 
Peru  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  20  25  26  29  24  14  13 
Philippines  Feinstein (2005)  20  14  17  15  15  11  11 
Portugal  Moll (1991), Feinstein (2005)  24  20  27  37  39  45  48 
Thailand  Feinstein (2005)  16  10  10  12  13  18  19 
Turkey  Moll (1991)  .  18  22  22  20  22  21 
Taiwan  Feinstein (2005)  14  10  11  17  27  42  . 
Venezuela  Moll (1991)  21  33  36  32  39  28  20 
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  1995  1995  1995  1995  1994  1995      1994  1993 
Algeria  74  49  100  59  3.7    35.3  1995  24  3 
Argentina  96  96  90  19  2.6  64  52.2  2001  7  32 
Brazil  83  83  86  55  2.8  72  60  1996  8  60 
Chile  95  95  85  50  2.5  85  56.6  1994  28  19 
Colombia  91  91  89  65  2.6  76  57.1  1996  15  40 
Egypt  64  39      3.5  64  28.9  1995  22  33 
Ghana  76  53  97  42  5.3  56  33.9  1992  25  23 
Indonesia  90  78  99  96  2.7  62  36.5  1996  25  53 
Korea 
(South) 
99  97  91  64  1.8  89  31.6  1993  36  93 
Malaysia  89  78  100  66  3.4  88  48.5  1995  90  65 
Mexico  92  87  72  38  3.2  83  53.7  1995  11  53 
Morocco  57  31      3.5  52  39.5  1998-99  22  57 
Nigeria  67  47      5.6  39  45  1992-93  22  2 
Pakistan  50  33  91  53  5.4  60  31.2  1996-97  16  85 
Peru  94  83  100  60  3.1  60  46.2  1996  11  17 
Philippines  95  94  96  52  3.8  83  42.9  1994  34  76 
South 
Africa 
82  82      3.9  70  59.3  1993-94  24  73 
Sri Lanka  93  87      2.4  46  34.4  1995  34  72 
Thailand  96  92  96  50  2  81  46.2  1992  39  72 
Turkey  92  72  82  14  3.2  92  41.5  1994  21  71 
Venezuela  92  80  100  59  3.2  79  46.8  1995  30  14 
                     
Median  91  82  93  54  3.2  71  45    24  53 
Mean  84  74  92  52  3.3  70  44    26  48 
Standard 
deviation 
14  22  8  19  1.04  15  10    17  28 
Sources: World Development reports  (World Bank, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001) 
a: The “census year” indicates the date of the survey on which the Gini coefficient is based. 
 
 